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This paper examines the recent evolution of monetary policy since the adoption of
formal inflation targeting in Brazil. We argue that the new policy framework has been
subject to a severe test in its first years of existence, represented by external shocks – oil
prices, and increased international financial volatility. Moreover, we examine some
selected issues that deserve due consideration given their importance to the conduct of
monetary policy. The first issue is the presence of a substantial portion of prices with
backward-looking adjustment, a fact that affects monetary policy reaction since it
reduces the efficiency of domestic interest rates in controlling inflation. The second
addresses the question of how inflation targets should be monitored in a country that has
an ongoing economic program with the International Monetary Fund. This last issue is
particularly important when considering the effects of shortening monitoring horizons






In mid-January 1999, Brazil abandoned its crawling exchange-rate band regime.
Surprisingly enough, the country’s economic performance in the aftermath of this
episode was much better than what was expected, given the performance of other
emerging market economies after a move toward floating. In fact, despite the large
devaluation of the domestic currency that followed the regime shift, GDP grew 0.8% in
1999 and 4.5% in 2000, while consumer price inflation behaved much in line with the
declining targets established in mid-1999, of 8% and 6%, respectively.
This paper examines the main factors that helped Brazil withstand the negative effects
of a change in the exchange rate regime and enabled the economy to recover rapidly,
namely, the combination of fiscal restraint with a well-defined purpose for monetary
policy. The following section describes the macroeconomic background that culminated
in the currency devaluation, the volatile expectations environment that followed, and the
evolution of monetary policy in the transition to inflation targeting.
Section 3 presents a stylized model that we use in our discussion of the transmission
mechanism. Section 4 discusses the transmission mechanism, highlighting the main
channels, the lag structure and the exchange rate passthrough. These issues are
presented with a prospective view of their evolution as the economy converges to its
new steady state.
The model outlined in Section 3 serves as the basis for the simulations performed in
Sections 5 and 6. Section 5 describes how monetary policy has reacted to shocks since
                                                
à The opinions in this paper reflect the authors’ view, not necessarily the official position of the Central
Bank of Brazil. Needless to say, any errors are our own responsibility.6
the implementation of the inflation-targeting regime based on inflation forecasting. We
examine the Central Bank’s track record in responding to all sorts of shocks, including
international oil prices, food price, and volatility in international financial markets.
Given the relative weight of institutionally backward-looking prices in the consumer
basket, we decompose the model into inertial prices and market prices to show how the
institutional framework in Brazil affects the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy and therefore its instrument’s efficiency when reacting to shocks.
Section 6 focuses on alternative ways to monitor the performance of monetary policy
under inflation targeting. This issue is especially relevant when a country has an
ongoing program with the IMF, since the traditional quarterly reviews demand a
monitoring horizon much shorter than that of the targeting economy. We show that if
the higher-frequency targets are not set in accordance with the lower frequency ones,
and if policymakers try to meet all the targets, there will be suboptimal outcomes in
terms of inflation and output variability. Section 7 concludes.
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The Brazilian economy has undergone significant structural changes in the last decade.
In the early 1990s the country’s real income has remained stagnant, with low investment
and saving rates, and very limited access to international capital markets. Inflation was
high and rising, helping to conceal the serious structural imbalances of the public sector
and making extremely difficult to carry out even the simplest planning activities. Brazil
has started to make real progress in economic and financial stability only since 1994,
with good results in terms of inflation, growth, trade liberalization, and international
insertion. Despite this relative success, critical problems remained to be addressed,
mainly the rising deficits in the current account and the deterioration of fiscal position.
It is important to discuss this macroeconomic evolution in order to understand the
current economic environment, characterized by a consistent combination of inflation
targeting, floating exchange rate, and fiscal discipline.7
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The stabilization program known as 5HDO Plan was successful in putting an end to
Brazil’s history of chronic high inflation. It was preceded by a minimal fiscal
adjustment and followed by tight monetary control. The key issue was to coordinate a
deindexing process to break the inflationary inertia, since the automatic price
adjustments to past inflation were not synchronized. The solution was the introduction
in March 1994 of a new unit of account, the unified reference value (URV), whose
value the Central Bank fine-tuned on a daily basis in line with the loss of the currency’s
purchasing power. All prices and wages, as well as the exchange rate, were
denominated in URV. Prices were converted directly, while wages were converted by
their average past purchasing power. Then, on July 1
st 1994, the indexation mechanism
was extinguished and the URV became the new currency, called the UHDO. Demand
pressures naturally arose with the sharp inflation decline – for example, the reduction of
inflation tax alone accounted for an additional disposable income of R$ 15 billion in the
subsequent twelve months – and a very tight monetary policy was needed to counter
these pressures, mainly with high real interest rates and stringent credit restrictions.
Even though the stabilization program was correctly conceived with due attention to
fiscal austerity, the implementation of the comprehensive agenda of structural reforms
was much slower and more difficult than had been expected, especially when legislative
support was needed. On the other hand, the international financial environment seemed
favorable, and the Brazilian economy reentered the route of foreign investment after the
rescheduling of its external debt within the Brady Plan. With these perspectives, it was
natural for policymakers to concentrate first on the fight against inflation and
indexation, since the immediate results in this front would determine the future of
stabilization, and there seemed to be enough time to address the remaining
fundamentals.
Another key issue in the first phases of stabilization was the choice of a suitable
exchange-rate policy. The monetary authorities decided to start with a float, which
immediately led to a continuous nominal appreciation, given that the high real interest8
rates were effectively attracting capital inflows. The Mexican crisis in late 1994
prompted a shift to a crawling-band regime, which was formally adopted in March
1995. From July 1995 through mid-January 1999, exchange-rate policy was conducted
on the basis of an annual devaluation target of around 7.5 percent. The price
stabilization plan was successful, since the economy eliminated short-run indexation
practices, and annual inflation dropped from 929% in 1994 to less than 2% in 1998.
The stabilization process included a wide program of economic reforms. The size of the
public sector was substantially reduced through privatization of state companies
operating in sectors like telecommunications, chemistry, steel, railroads, banking and
mining. Likewise, trade liberalization was deepened through the reduction of import
tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers. The financial system was submitted to a
full-fledged restructuring: unsound institutions were liquidated, merged or restructured;
prudential regulation was updated; and supervision was reorganized to take on a more
preventive approach. This strengthening of the financial system was a crucial element in
the country’s reaction to the external crises that were to come.
The fiscal position gradually worsened, however, as the inflation decline unveiled the
structural imbalances of public accounts due to the elimination of the so-called inverted
Olivera-Tanzi effect, or the reduction of real spending that results from the
postponement of non-indexed public expenditure
1. Despite the initial fiscal adjustment,
conditions for its sustainability were not created. Several constitutional reforms of high
priority to the government remained stuck in the congressional agenda, including the tax
reform, the establishment of limits on public spending in all levels of administration,
and the social security reform for both private and public sectors. The lack of political
agreement on the need to change the fiscal regime, combined with continued high
interest rates and sterilized intervention – which were required to support the exchange-
rate policy – fuelled the public sector debt (see figure 1). Currency appreciation, growth
of domestic demand, and incentives to short-term capital inflows resulted in a rapid
                                                
1 Bacha (1999) provides a comprehensive discussion of the fiscal problems that characterized the initial
years of the 5HDO Plan.9
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The first shock was triggered by the Asian crisis in the second half of 1997. In the face
of capital outflows, the Central Bank promptly reacted by doubling the basic interest
rate to 43.4% p.a. in November. The government pressed for a strong fiscal response to
complement the monetary tightening. In a matter of weeks, the Congress approved a
fiscal program called ‘3DFNDJH¶, which featured spending cuts and tax increases
totaling R$20 billion, or about 2% of GDP
2 The fast recovery of international reserves
that followed allowed the Central Bank to reduce interest rates, but only gradually: they
reached their pre-crisis level in July 1998. The fiscal program was not fully
implemented, however. In particular, the spending cuts were postponed, as the political
will to undertake them diminished in line with the perceived contagion effects.
The second shock, which followed the Russian moratorium in August 1998, met a
much-deteriorated fiscal outlook. The country was much more affected by international
                                                
2 The name ‘3DFNDJH’ derives from the fact that it consisted of fifty-one different fiscal measures.10
turbulence than in the previous episode as a result of a worldwide reassessment of risk
exposure to emerging markets. Capital outflows were substantial in the ensuing months.
The authorities responded with the same policy mix used to counter the Asian crisis
effects. In September, the basic interest rate doubled to 40%, calling for a new fiscal
tightening. This time, however, the government could not count on market support, a
price it paid for not delivering the previously promised fiscal results. To address the
issue of enforceability of fiscal discipline, the government sought a preventive program
with the IMF. The financial support package amounted to US$41.5 billion, with about
two thirds of the total becoming available in the first year. However, expectations
deteriorated further at the end of 1998 after Congress rejected a bill to increase social
security contributions for civil servants and to extend it to pensioners.
This time, the fiscal tightening measures were mostly implemented. Market confidence,
however, continued to erode up to January 1999, partly reflecting concerns over the
newly elected governors’ commitment to adjust their states’ finances. Any new sign of
potential deviation from the fiscal target induced extreme market nervousness. Given its
limited ability to sustain the exchange-rate crawling band regime, the Central Bank tried
to promote a controlled devaluation of the UHDO in the second week of January, but the
absence of credibility led the market to bet massively against the new arrangement.
Without alternatives, the monetary authority allowed the exchange rate to float, and the
dollar value quickly moved from R$1.21 prior to the devaluation to nearly R$2.00 at the
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The exchange rate devaluation had an immediate impact on tradable-goods prices at the
wholesale level, fuelling expectations of a permanent rise in consumer inflation. The
wholesale price index (IPA) increased 7% in February, the highest monthly rate since
1994, while consumer price inflation rose less, at slightly more than 1%. Given the
change in the exchange-rate regime, the agreement with the IMF had to be
reformulated. The estimates set in the reviewed Memorandum of Economic Policy were
-3.5% for GDP growth and 17% for inflation, measured by the general price index
3. The
great uncertainties surrounding the country’s future prompted a volatile expectations
environment, with inflation and recession forecasts much larger than those above.
At the beginning of March, a new Board of Governors took office at the Central Bank.
The policy guidelines set by the new team had two aims: to control inflation
expectations, thereby reducing the degree of uncertainty in the short-run; and to design
the new monetary regime based on inflation targeting.
                                                
3 The general price index in Brazil is a weighted average of wholesale prices (60%), consumer prices
(30%) and civil construction prices (10%).12
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The shift to a floating exchange-rate regime occurred in a moment of crisis. Even so, the
regime seemed reasonable for Brazil. The country does not present the classical features
required for an optimal currency area with the dollar or any other currency, and it is
hard to find arguments to justify the adoption of a fixed exchange-rate regime, even in
the more recent literature about monetary integration as a credibility instrument.
Therefore, the first task of the Central Bank’s new board was to find a monetary policy
strategy compatible with the floating exchange-rate regime.
A fully discretionary monetary policy did not seem suitable, given the unstable nature of
expectations during the transition period. It was natural to opt for a more rigid system,
one that would represent a definite, strong commitment but that could also offer some
indication of the future path of the economy; one that would allow enough flexibility for
policymaking but that could also effectively anchor the public’s expectations. The
authorities therefore decided to set up an inflation-targeting regime.
An interesting feature of the new monetary policy regime was its gradual
implementation. Adopting formal inflation targets was not feasible right after the
floating, given the uncertainties surrounding the post-devaluation inflationary process.
At the same time, the adoption of the framework required institutional changes to ensure
operational independence for the Central Bank, as well as some time for consolidating
the shift in fiscal policy. The Central Bank therefore immediately announced its
intention to adopt an inflation-targeting framework, but it left the formal introduction of
the program, together with the specification of the target value, to the second half of the
year.
In relation to fiscal policy, a series of reforms were in course. In January, Congress
approved an increase in social security contributions for working and retired civil
servants (the same bill that had been rejected one month earlier), as well as the 1999
budget. In March, the bill extending the Provisional Contribution on Financial
Transactions (CPMF) was approved, though with a five-month delay in the13
government’s original schedule. Additional temporary tax increases and spending cuts
were set up in the first quarter to compensate for this loss of revenues and to ensure
strict adherence to the fiscal targets (namely, a consolidated public sector primary
surplus of 3.1% of GDP in 1999). These measures included an increase in the turnover
tax (COFINS) from 2% to 3% and its extension to financial institutions; an increase in
the social contribution on net profits (CSLL) from 8% to 12%; and a marginal 0.38%
increase in the tax on financial operations (IOF) in investment fund deposits and credit
operations.
All of these actions were a clear demonstration of the government’s commitment to
fiscal adjustment. Policymakers seized the opportunity created by the crisis to enforce a
major shift in the fiscal regime, thus laying a fundamental pillar to support inflation
targeting. Although the reforms that were needed to ensure long-run fiscal equilibrium
were far from complete, the government had the necessary instruments to achieve a
reasonable fiscal performance for at least a decade. Even the most skeptical analysts had
to acknowledge the feasibility of the announced fiscal targets.
The new Board took office at the Central Bank on March 4
th, and the team immediately
worked to calm financial markets. The expectation that an inflation hike could cause the
real rates of return on public debt instruments to drop into the negative range was the
first to be attacked. The Monetary Policy Committee (Copom), whose voting members
are the Governor and Deputy Governors, raised the basic short-term interest rate (the
6HOLF) from 39% p.a. to 45% p.a., taking into account that the future contracts for the
next maturity were already trading at 43.5%. The idea was to accommodate the
devaluation shock, but to counter its further propagation. It was acceptable that the
relative price movements set in march with the devaluation would shift the price level
upward, but the interest rate had to be set high enough to prevent the second-round
inflationary process that could follow. The question was how to translate these ideas
into practice, given the then chaotic state of expectations.
Expectations therefore had to be anchored one way or another, and for that purpose
clear communication was crucial. The Committee therefore released a brief explanation14
of the policy decision right after the meeting – the minutes used to be released only after
3 months – asserting that “PDLQWDLQLQJSULFHVWDELOLW\LVWKHSULPDU\REMHFWLYHRIWKH
&HQWUDO %DQN”
4. Other official declarations indicated that price stability meant a
monthly rate of inflation in the range of 0.5-0.7% by the end of the year. Moreover, ³LQ
DIORDWLQJH[FKDQJHUDWHUHJLPHVXVWDLQHGILVFDODXVWHULW\WRJHWKHUZLWKDFRPSDWLEOH
PRQHWDU\DXVWHULW\VXSSRUWVSULFHVWDELOLW\DVILVFDOSROLF\LVJLYHQLQWKHVKRUWUXQWKH
FRQWURO RYHU LQIODWLRQDU\ SUHVVXUHV VKRXOG EH H[HUWHG E\ WKH LQWHUHVW UDWH REVHUYHG
LQIODWLRQLVGXHWRWKHFXUUHQF\GHSUHFLDWLRQDQGPDUNHWVH[SHFWDIXUWKHUULVHLQWKH






In addition to the interest rate hike, the remunerated reserve requirement on time
deposits was raised from 20% to 30% in order to reduce bank liquidity. Temporary
incentives for capital inflows were granted in the form of tax reductions scheduled to
last until the end of June. In the foreign exchange market, the rule was free floating, but
the Central Bank kept the prerogative to make a limited amount of unsterilized
intervention to counter disorderly market conditions
7. The efforts to seek the voluntary
commitment of foreign banks to maintain their exposure to Brazil continued.
The general outlook started to improve soon after, with a reversal of the exchange rate
overshooting (the exchange rate fell from R$2.20 in the first week of March to R$1.66
at the end of April) and a reduction in both observed and expected inflation rates. The
downward bias was applied twice before the Copom’s next meeting: the interest rate
was reduced first to 42% in late March and then to 39.5% in early April.
                                                
4 Explanatory Note to Copom’s Decision – March 4, 1999.
5 The bias on the interest rate was also an important novelty: it delegated to the Central Bank’s Governor
the power to alter interest rates during the period between two ordinary Committee meetings (usually 5
weeks). A downward bias allows the Governor to reduce the interest rate. However, if an increase in the
interest rate is needed instead, while a downward bias is valid, an extraordinary meeting is required.
6 Explanatory Note to Copom’s Decision – March 4, 1999.
7 Brazil Memorandum of Economic Policies, released on March 8, 1999.15
Market confidence was also strengthening as a result of delivered fiscal promises. The
public sector primary surplus reached 4.1% of GDP in the first quarter, in excess of the
government’s target. The first evidence of decelerating inflation materialized in the
April figures. The reversal of the exchange rate overshooting and the effect of the new
crop on food prices were held responsible for the immediate decline in inflation. The
wholesale price index, in which tradable goods have a large weight, registered negative
changes in April (-0.3%) and May (-0.8%). Consumer inflation measured by the broad
consumer price index (IPCA) fell to 0.6% in April and 0.3% in May (figure 3). Inflation
expectations followed suit: the median of market forecasts of consumer inflation for












































































































The positive evolution of the macroeconomic environment allowed further reductions of
the basic interest rate. However, the level of uncertainty rose again as a result of
external developments. By mid-May, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board introduced an
upward bias for the federal funds rate, which remained constant at 4.75% after
December 1998, signaling a gradual monetary tightening for the second half of the year.
                                                
8 The Central Bank’s Investor Relations Group (GCI) collects market inflation forecasts daily, sampling
70 financial institutions and consulting companies. The survey was initiated in April 1999. The data are
available on CD-ROM ()RFXV DQG RWKHU 5HSRUWV ), and at
http://www.bcb.gov.br/updatescd/default.asp. For IPCA, the survey begins in June, when this index was
chosen as the reference for inflation targeting (see figure 5). Data before June are based on a preliminary
unpublished survey of a very small number of institutions.16
Expectations of higher international interest rates undermined risk perception, as did
potential contagion effects stemming from doubts about the electoral process and the
currency board sustainability in Argentina. The immediate repercussions were on
market-determined interest rates and the exchange rate. The slope of the term-structure
curve turned from negative to positive and the exchange rate moved upward to the
R$1.75-1.80 range (Figure 4). A subjective explanation to this new depreciation then
became popular in the specialized press and was to recur in similar subsequent episodes:
foreign exchange market participants, who were still unused to the new floating regime,
tried to infer the “Central Bank’s intervention band” – if there was one, considering the
limits imposed by the performance criterion on net international reserves set up in the
IMF agreement. More objective factors included the concentration of amortization
payments of private sector external debt due in June, the combination of rising risk
premium and a declining interest rate differential, and the near termination of the
temporary tax incentives on capital inflows introduced in March. Therefore, monetary
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In sum, the policy response to the crisis triggered by the initial exchange rate
devaluation consisted of fiscal and monetary tightening, and it was successful in17
subduing inflation expectations. Although an inflation-targeting framework was not
formally in place, the Central Bank already justified its monetary policy decisions as if
it were. The short-term interest rate became the main instrument for attaining the
inflation objectives, and with inflation expectations under control, it was cut in half in
less than four months.
 7+(67</,=('6758&785$/02'(/
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According to Mishkin and Savastano (2000), inflation targeting comprises five main
features: (i) the public announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation;
(ii) an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary goal of economic
policy, to which other objectives are subordinated; (iii) an information-inclusive
strategy, encompassing the use of several variables and models, to enable the monetary
authority to set policy instruments; (iv) a transparent monetary policy strategy that
ascribes a central role to communicating to the public the plans, objectives and rationale
of the central bank’s decisions; and (v) mechanisms for making monetary authorities
accountable for achieving the inflation targets. The first feature, a numerical target
value, must be low, feasible and compatible with the macroeconomic outlook.
With this in mind, the Brazilian authorities placed a high priority on understanding the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to prices, with emphasis on developing a
set of forecasting tools, including structural models for the transmission mechanism,
non-structural time-series vector autoregression (VAR) and autoregression moving
average (ARMA) models for short-term forecasting, measures of core inflation, leading
inflation indicators, and surveys of market expectations. The most important of these
tools is the family of structural models, which is estimated and/or calibrated with the
dual objective of identifying the mechanism of monetary policy and assessing the
transmission lags involved. A representative structural model of this family contains
four basic equations. The first is a standard IS equation that captures the aggregate
demand response to real interest rate and real exchange rate. The second is a typical
open-economy Phillips curve, representing the supply-side trade-offs. The third is an18
equation for the exchange rate and the fourth is an interest rate rule that is essential for
simulations.
The standard specification of an IS curve with quarterly frequency could be as follows:
,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where K is the log of the output gap; ULVWKHORJRIWKHUHDOLQWHUHVWUDWH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 LV
the log of real exchange rate; and e
K represents a demand shock. Other specifications
might include different lag structures or additional explanatory variables. Bogdanski HW
DO. (2000), for example, present a ‘fiscal’ IS specification, which explicitly considers the
effects of the shift in fiscal regime on aggregate demand.
The first problem for the Central Bank was how to measure the variables that are not
directly observable, like the output gap. The usual starting point is the calculation of
potential output, either by extracting a linear time trend from historical GDP data, by
filtering out the GDP series, or by estimating production functions. In the Brazilian
case, the linear trend and HP filter were preferred since both produced similar results.
The output gap was then obtained by the difference between actual and potential GDP,
allowing direct estimates of the different IS curves. However, research efforts on this
crucial topic are far from over.
The estimation results posed a second problem, since they were heavily influenced by
post-5HDO Plan data (third quarter 1994 to fourth quarter 1998). As mentioned in the
previous section, the managed exchange-rate regime in the 5HDO Plan was very
instrumental in reducing inflation and keeping it low, at the cost of setting the domestic
interest rates high enough to attain a balance-of-payments position compatible with the
desired parity. The equilibrium real interest rate under the current floating exchange-rate
regime should therefore be substantially lower than under the previous regime. The
transition effects stemming from the new equilibrium level of real interest rates called
for a long-term calibration of the demand side reduced-form model. In the long-run
steady state, the output gap should remain constant at zero. As a first approximation, it
                                                                                                                                              
9 This section is based on Bogdanski, Tombini and Werlang (2000).19
is assumed that the long-term equilibrium real interest rate must equal the potential
GDP growth rate. A thorough analysis of this question should also include fiscal policy
considerations, like the long-run fiscal balance and debt administration issues, which
may add or subtract a few percentage points to the first approximation for the neutral
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the real exchange rate coefficient, is very close to zero. So, a straightforward calibration
would consist of estimating the IS curve with the additional restriction on the pair
(b0,b2), whose ratio must equal the long-term equilibrium real interest rate.
The supply side of the economy is modeled with a Phillips-curve specification, directly
relating price inflation to some measure of real disequilibrium (typically the output
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where: p is the log of consumer price inflation, K is the log of the output gap, S
)￿is the
log of foreign producer price index, H is the log of the nominal exchange rate, D
represents the first-difference operator, (W(×) is the expectation operator, conditional on
information available at time t, and e
Q stands for a supply shock. The coefficients on the
right-hand side of the equation, except for the output gap one, are constrained to sum to
unity; this ensures the long-run verticality of the Phillips curve, that is, that inflation is
neutral with respect to real output in the long run.
This specification combines backward- and forward-looking elements. A purely
backward-looking specification would be simpler to estimate and would fit past data.
However, it would also be vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Its predictive power would
be weak because of the recent changes in monetary policy and exchange-rate regimes,
which almost certainly have altered the formation of inflation expectations and the
short-run trade-off between inflation and output. Using a purely forward-looking
specification would be an attempt to overcome the parameter instability commonly
found after structural breaks. It might also stem from the natural assumption that as the
inflation-targeting regime gains credibility, expectations tend to converge to the targeted
value. Such a specification raises difficult estimation issues, however, about the20
appropriate measures of expectations, especially when reliable survey data are not
available.
The Central Bank tested different assumptions about the expectations mechanism, but
the estimations generally led to a weighted average of past and future inflation, with at
least 60% on the forward-looking component. The preferred Phillips-curve
specification, together with the other equations in the complete model, exhibited the
desired dynamic properties of the economy, with inflation persistence arising from
sluggish adjustment forced by the backward-looking terms, while the rational
expectations environment was preserved by the forward-looking component, thought to
be increasingly important in the transition period after the changes in monetary policy
and exchange-rate regimes.
For the purpose of running simulations to investigate the implications for inflation and
output of different monetary policy rules, it is easy to experiment with alternative
assumptions about the expectations formation mechanism. For example, expectations
can be taken exogenously from a market survey and augmented by a hypothesis about
how they react to new information, or they can be calculated recursively to ensure
consistency with the model.
The passthrough of exchange-rate changes to domestic inflation is another key issue in
the Phillips curve setup. Several linear and non-linear specifications for the passthrough
coefficients were tested, and the alternatives implemented in the preferred simulation
tool were narrowed down to four. The first is a standard constant coefficient
constant 4 = a , simply estimated from a suitable sample of past data. The second is a
quadratic transfer from exchange rate variations to inflation,  ) ( 1 1 42 41 4 - - + D + = W
)
W H S a a a .
The third is a level-dependent coefficient,  1 42 41 4 - + = W H a a a , which is estimated under
the assumption that the passthrough depends on the level of the log of the nominal




















, motivated by a simple partial equilibrium model in which
exchange-rate devaluations shift the supply curve of competitive producers of tradable21
goods
10. All non-linear variants aim to capture more precisely the effects of a temporary
exchange rate overshooting. Given the small number of observations available in a
quarterly frequency, however, their results were very close to the linear variant and
consistent with international evidence that the passthrough coefficient is inversely
proportional to the degree of real exchange rate appreciation at the moment prior to the
devaluation.
The determination of the nominal exchange rate is as important as it is difficult. The
Central Bank’s first approach was to use an uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition to
model the link between the exchange rate and the interest rate through capital markets.
The UIP condition relates expected changes in the exchange rate between two countries
to their interest rate differential and a risk premium:
,,,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where: His the log of the exchange rate, L is the log of domestic interest rate, L
) is the log
of foreign interest rate, and [ is the log of risk premium. Taking the first difference
W
)
W W W W W W W [ L L H H ( H ( D - D - D = D - - - + 1 1  and assuming for simplicity that the expectation
change follows a white noise process
11  W W W W W H ( H ( h = - - + 1 1 , it is possible to specify the
exchange rate dynamics as:
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This equation contains two exogenous variables: the foreign interest rate and the risk
premium. Given the relative stability of foreign interest rates, reasonably accurate
projections can be obtained from contracts traded in international futures markets.
However, the risk premium, which can be measured by the spread between U.S.
Treasury bonds and Brazilian sovereign debt, has presented high volatility in recent
years. The risk premium is usually associated with macroeconomic fundamentals and a
number of other subjective factors that are not easily anticipated. Two alternative
approaches were therefore considered. The first was to gather the opinions of Copom
members about the future evolution of the country’s risk premium, conditional on the
                                                
10 See the appendix in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000).22
overall scenario and based on anecdotal evidence; these opinions were then translated
into an exogenous expected path to be used in simulations. The second approach was to
make assumptions linking the risk premium behavior to the main objective factors
thought to influence it, thereby allowing the model to endogenously determined the
premium. A list of these factors would typically include the fiscal stance, perspectives
on the current account balance, international liquidity conditions and interest rates, the
performance of foreign capital markets, commodity prices, and country rating.
Finally, the fourth equation is left unspecified in the general model. Since the primary
instrument of monetary policy is the short-term interest rate set by the Central Bank, it
is necessary to choose a policy rule in order to run simulations in any of the different
reduced-form model specifications. The rules can be divided in three basic families:
fully exogenous interest rate paths, linear combination of system variables and optimal
response functions.
An exogenous interest rate path is useful for analyzing the consequences of a particular
interest rate trajectory, such as that implied by financial market instruments or the
implicit path considered in the government budget. A particular rule of this family is
helpful for institutional communication. The inflation forecasts published in the
quarterly inflation report are traditionally constructed under the assumption that the
short-term interest rate will remain constant at the current level along the projection
period. This projection is illustrated by means of an inflation fan chart, which shows the
probability distribution around the central forecast for each quarter. On visual
inspection, one can infer whether monetary policy should be altered and in which
direction
12.
The interest rate rule can be written as a linear function of some system variables. For
example, monetary policy can react contemporaneously to the output gap and deviations
                                                                                                                                              
11 This is equivalent to a random walk with monetary surprise, where a surprise is characterized by
changes in interest rate differentials or in risk perception.
12 Britton, Fischer and Whitley (1998) explain how to interpret inflation forecasts presented as fan charts.
Haldane (1997) discusses how the introduction of a partially subjective probability distribution may help
clarify the policymakers’ assessment of the current economic stance. The Brazilian ,QIODWLRQ5HSRUWV
make use of both resources to convey information about monetary policy decisions.23
of inflation from target:  ) ) ( ( ) 1 ( 3 2
*
1 1 w w p p w l l + + - + - = - W W W W K L L . When l=1, this is
equivalent to a standard Taylor rule, whereas it is a Taylor rule with interest rate
smoothing when lÎ(0,1). The values of  i can be set arbitrarily or using specific
optimization procedures available in the simulation tool. Finally, an optimal interest rate
rule can be found by minimizing an appropriate loss function, subject to the model in
use.
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The initial modeling efforts succeeded in reaching an early mature stage – that is, a
reasonable degree of reliability and sensible dynamics. Two qualifications must be
stressed, however. First, the general limitations stemming from model and parameter
uncertainty apply. Second, the statistical time series for the Brazilian economy after the
floating is too short to yield sufficiently robust results. Moreover, a sequence of failed
stabilization plans from 1986 to 1994 produced important structural breaks in many
economic series, thus making it extremely difficult to treat them with the usual
econometric techniques. The various non-structural tools are therefore fundamental for
complementing and checking the consistency of structural modeling results.
Policymakers are well aware of the limitations of the available tools and have no
illusions about their effectiveness. Nonetheless, the models have been very useful and
have helped discipline the discussion on monetary policy within the Central Bank.
This modeling approach embodies the understanding that as in most other economies,
the most important transmission channels are through aggregate demand, exchange rate
and expectations. Preliminary estimation results with quarterly data indicate that
permanent changes in the basic interest rate take one to two quarters to impact aggregate
demand. This aggregate demand response, in turn, takes an additional quarter to be fully
perceived in consumer inflation. Changes in short-term interest rates are thus
transmitted to inflation through the aggregate demand channel with an estimated lag of
two to three quarters. The exchange rate channel is estimated to have a shorter
transmission lag: the effect of permanent interest rate changes on consumer prices
through this channel is contemporaneous (on a quarterly basis), but its magnitude is24
smaller than through the demand channel. These results are based on the strong
assumptions that expectations remain consistent with the model after any policy change
and that the policy change itself is a sufficiently small departure from the initial position
so that the log-linear approximation remains valid.
Further qualifications come into play at this point. First, the lag structure in the
aggregate demand channel is shorter than that found in the majority of either
industrialized or developing economies. This may be the result of the large swings in
real interest rates that characterize the post-5HDO Plan sampling period. These large
swings generated prompt output and inflation responses, although the magnitude of the
responses was relatively small in comparison with the interest rate variations. The lag is
expected to increase gradually as the economy converges toward its long-run steady-
state equilibrium.
Second, although the lag structure is short, the overall effect is modest, for several
reasons. The financial system, for example, is overregulated, with a variety of credit
restrictions, mandatory allocation of funds, and distorting taxes. The banking spread has
therefore remained extraordinarily high, and the system as a whole presents a low
leverage compared to international standards. This banking spread makes the
transmission channel from the basic interest rate to market-determined final loan rates
much weaker than desirable, and it explains part of the high volatility of interest rates
observed in the last three to five years. This fact leaves the impression that a slight
deviation from the expected path requires a significant change in the basic interest rate
to bring the economy back to the central path. In other words, the interest-rate elasticity
of the macroeconomic equilibrium is low. A series of parallel projects is underway to
correct these distortions in the financial system and improve the efficiency of the
transmission mechanism.
The third qualification has to do with the passthrough. Goldfajn and Werlang (2000),
who analyze panel data, conclude that the passthrough coefficient generally depends on
four main factors: the degree of overvaluation of the exchange rate prior to the
devaluation, the previous level of inflation, the degree of openness, and the economic25
activity level. On this ground, Brazil shifted to a floating exchange rate regime with
good prospects for a low degree of passthrough, since inflation was low and the
exchange rate showed clear signals of overvaluation after the deterioration of the terms
of trade and the Russian crisis in 1998. Open and heated economies tend to present
higher passthrough coefficients, other things equal. Although trade liberalization
progressed well and fast in the 1990s, the degree of openness of the Brazilian economy
(around 14 percent) is considerably low in comparison with international standards.
Furthermore, the economy evolved below its potential after the Russian crisis. When the
UHDO floated, the output gap was undoubtedly negative, which provided a major force for
countering passthrough pressures. Preliminary results thus confirm the tendency for a
low passthrough.
 32/,&<5($&7,21726+2&.6
In this section we examine how monetary policy reacted to shocks after inflation
targeting was implemented in Brazil. We begin by identifying the main shocks that
occurred after July 1999 and the corresponding policy behavior. The identification
addresses the nature as well as the duration of shocks. This task is obviously easier with
the benefit of hindsight, although in some cases even the H[SRVW interpretation of shocks
is not straightforward.
The problem of inflation persistence is another key factor for understanding the policy
reaction. Given the Brazilian institutional setting, which features a high weight of
backward-looking prices in the consumer basket, policy responses are different from
those in an environment in which all prices are forward-looking. Other peculiarities of
the Brazilian inflation-targeting framework are also relevant for discussing policy
reactions. These include the absence of escape clauses, the use of a headline price index,
and the adoption of multi-year targets. All these peculiarities leave relatively little room
for accommodation by monetary policy.
The term “backward-looking prices” deserves an explanation. These prices are also
known as “government-managed prices”, given that they used to be arbitrarily set by the26
government before the privatization of state companies. Government-managed prices
are now those that, in one way or another, are defined or affected by a public-sector
agency, independently of current supply and demand conditions, but not arbitrarily. The
major administered prices (and respective weights) in the reference consumer price
index (IPCA) fall into two categories: those that are defined at the federal government
level, including oil by-products (6%), electricity fees (3.3%), telephone and postal
services fees (3%), and the minimum wage (3%); and those that are defined at the local
governments level, including water and sewage fees (1,5%), public transportation (6%),
and property taxes (1%)
13. Taken together, these components account for around 25% of
IPCA, reflecting their importance in daily expenditures of households in the income
bracket from one to forty minimum wages. It is important to stress that ‘managed’ does
not mean ‘controlled’. Public utility fees constitute a substantial component of these
prices. Their adjustment leaves no room for discretion: they follow the terms of their
concession contracts; this links them to the past behavior of general price indices and
thus justifies the designation of “institutionally backward-looking prices”. The
minimum wage, in turn, is set by the Congress. The central government only has
effective direct control only over the wholesale prices of oil by-products, and it has been
resetting them in accordance with international prices, in anticipation of the full
liberalization of the domestic oil market scheduled for 2002.
 'HVFULSWLRQRI0DLQ6KRFNVDQG&RUUHVSRQGLQJ3ROLF\%HKDYLRU
We identified a total of eight shocks between July 1999 and November 2000, including
a wide variety of supply and “financial” shocks. The supply shocks were primarily
associated with food market conditions and backward-looking prices, which include the
effects of international oil prices. The financial shocks mainly derived from increased
international volatility and deterioration of the market perception of Brazil’s risk
premium, which immediately alters the exchange rate value. Seven out of eight are
classified as adverse shocks to the extent that their preponderate effect was to press
inflation upward. The taxonomy is somewhat dubious, given the fact that the economy
                                                
13 These figures are approximations, given that the actual weights vary over time.27
is generally hit by more than one shock at the same time. Disentangling the combined
effects of simultaneous shocks is somewhat arbitrary, as it is to associate monetary
policy decisions with individual shocks.
The Brazilian economy in this period was far from its long-run balance, particularly
with regard to the level of nominal and real interest rates. This means that in the absence
of shocks, the interest rate would be expected to follow a declining path. Therefore,
when policy reacted by keeping the interest rate constant, this actually represented a
policy tightening, and not an accommodative stance.
Table 1 summarizes the main shocks that hit the Brazilian economy in the first eighteen
months of inflation targeting.
7DEOH±0DLQ6KRFNVDQG3ROLF\5HDFWLRQ
7\SHRIVKRFN 7LPLQJ 'HVFULSWLRQ 5HDFWLRQ
 Backward-looking
prices (BLP)
Jul 1999 BLP higher than expected by the
market; oil price
Interest rate reduced from
22% to 21%
 BLP Jul / Aug
2000
BLP accompanied by adverse oil and
food prices
Interest rate held constant
at 16.5%
 Food prices Jun 2000 Inflation much lower than expected
in the first half
Interest rate reduced from
18.5% to 17.5%
 Financial Aug 1999 Disagreement with monetary policy,
increased hedging demand
Interest rate held constant
at 19.5%
 Financial Oct 1999 Inflation above expectations; trade
deficit; concerns about passthrough
and Y2K-related capital outflows
Interest rate held constant
at 19%; NIR floor
reviewed
 Financial Apr /
May 2000
Int. stock market volatility; oil price
upsurge; robustness of fundamentals
Interest rate held constant
at 19%
 Financial Nov 2000 Oil price; Argentina Interest rate held constant
at 16.5%
 Oil prices Dec 1999 Concerns about tightening abroad, oil
price evolution, and BLP for 2000;
unexpected rise in food prices
Interest rate held constant
at 19%; foreign exchange
auctions
The shocks that we classify as “backward-looking prices” (BLP) stem from the annual
resetting of public utility fees (including electrical energy, telecommunications, and
water and sewage) that occurs at the beginning of the third quarter in most of the eleven
cities covered by IPCA.
14 A great part of these services were privatized in the late
                                                
14 Other managed prices, like minimum wage, oil by-products, and urban bus fares, are not necessarily
readjusted at the beginning of the third quarter.28
1990s, and their price adjustment follows contracts linked to the past variation of
general price indices. The first shock (number 1 in table 1) is considered so because
market participants did not anticipate it correctly. After the inflation figures for July
1999 were released, inflation expectations rose by one full percentage point (see figure
5). However, Copom had been taking this temporary inflation rise into consideration
since the first issue of the Central Bank’s ,QIODWLRQ5HSRUW (June 1999). The Committee
decided to reduce the basic interest rate, since forecast year-end inflation was very close

































































































































































































Median of market expectations for y-o-y IPCA inflation.
Source: Investor Relation Group – Central Bank.
When the second BLP shock (number 2) occurred, one year after the first, it was fully
anticipated. Throughout the previous three quarters, monetary policy decisions had been
explained to the public as aiming to counter possible second-round effects of this
expected rise in backward-looking prices. However, this shock coincided with other two
adverse developments. First, the domestic price of oil by-products was raised as a result
of a new upsurge in international prices. Second, bad weather conditions throughout the
country pushed food prices strongly upward. Consequently, the inflation forecast for the
year was revised upward, and the interest rate was held constant. At the time, evidence
from previous episodes (for example, in the last quarter of 1999) indicated that the29
effects of supply shocks vanish quickly once they are recognized as temporary, and they
seem to have little impact on inflation expectations. This low price inertia was
confirmed with the substantial decline in inflation that was observed in September and
October 2000 (see figure 3).
The food price shock (number 3) was the only positive supply shock in the covered
period.
15 It consisted of a gradual reduction in food prices that began in February 2000,
but became stronger only in May and June. Thus, although this shock was identified
early, the presence of other shocks in April and May concealed its effect on inflation
expectations. The external uncertainties were attenuated in late June and the inflation
forecast was revised downward with the positive influence of food prices, allowing a
one percentage point reduction in the basic interest rate.
The shocks we denominate as “financial” comprise four episodes featuring considerable
shifts in the financial market perception of risks, which led to an increased difference
between medium- and short-term interest rates, as well as to changes in the value of the
exchange rate. These financial shocks reflect both the market reaction to monetary
policy stance and changes in risk premium motivated either by domestic fundamentals
or by external developments.
The first of these shocks (number 4), which hit the economy in August 1999, stemmed
from a combination of factors. First, as shock number 1 caused market inflation
expectations to rise sharply in July, the pace at which the Central Bank was reducing the
interest rates was seen as too rapid (see figure 5). Second, the level of external
uncertainties was rising fast, mainly because monetary tightening in the United States
generated concerns that financing for the Brazilian private sector would be inadequate,
especially toward the end of the year. Also, for the first time since the Gulf war, oil
prices became a serious concern, together with their potential inflationary impact on
Brazil. This caused a continuous depreciation of the real, and the demand for hedging
instruments against further devaluation rose. Monetary policy response was twofold.
First, hedge demand was matched by increased placement of dollar-indexed liabilities,30
since private market instruments were not available in appropriate amounts.
16 Second,
the interest rate was held constant, interrupting the sequence of reductions initiated in
mid-March 1999 (see figure 4). The interest rate level was thought to be enough to take
care of inflationary pressures through the aggregate demand channel. If expectations
deteriorated further, however, then the passthrough could endanger the achievement of
the year target, making a tougher policy response advisable. The strategy was
successful, as expectations improved: fiscal policy delivered better results than targeted,
observed inflation fell until September, and sovereign risk perception started a
continuous decline that ended only in April 2000.
In October the foreign exchange market experienced a liquidity shrink that coincided
with a concentration of amortization payments of private sector debt (shock number 5).
Moreover, the trade deficit was not recovering at the expected velocity and there were
mounting concerns that Y2K fears would trigger capital outflows by the end of the year.
These factors brought about renewed pressure on the exchange rate. The policy reaction
this time was of a different nature, aimed at coping with the temporary liquidity
shortage expected for the upcoming weeks. The measures included lowering the floor
on net international reserves (NIR) – a performance criterion in the IMF agreement – by
around US$ 2 billion; issuing new sovereign bonds; and arranging a loan from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB). In early December, the Central Bank structured
two forward foreign exchange auctions, in which it would sell a certain amount of
dollars in the end of December and repurchase the same amount in the beginning of
January, thereby eliminating doubts about possible currency shortages arising from
Y2K problems. The strategy was instrumental for improving confidence, and as a result,
capital inflows expected only for the next year were anticipated.
Shock number 6 is a good example of how the robustness of domestic fundamentals is
capable of avoiding the harmful effects of high external volatility. It started in April
2000 with the strong asset price correction in international markets, combined with a
                                                                                                                                              
15 Positive here means that it contributed to bringing inflation down.
16 These dollar-indexed bonds are not foreign debt, as they are payable in domestic currency, even though
their face value is adjusted according to the current exchange rate at maturity. The share of these bonds in
total public domestic debt had been declining gradually since January 1999.31
new upsurge in oil prices and an additional rise in the U.S. federal funds rate. As in all
other recent cases of increased external uncertainty, the risk premium was the first
variable to adjust to the new conditions. Inflation expectations did not deteriorate,
however. Expectations even improved somewhat, as the domestic macroeconomic
outlook presented no fundamental misalignment and the food price shock kept current
inflation low. The foreign exchange market adjusted itself smoothly, without any
intervention. There was no perceptible increase in hedging demand, and the maximum
exchange rate variation was less than 7% during the April-May period (see figure 4).
Copom held the interest rate constant in this period, but it clearly signaled in the
minutes from the April meeting that the real interest rate would decline as soon as the
external uncertainties were mitigated.
This brief description of the Brazilian experience shows that there is no unique
prescription for how monetary policy should react to shocks. Similar events may
demand different responses because the overall economic conditions should be taken
into account. Inflation targeting in Brazil was subject to serious tests right from start.
For example, the oil price shock, which pervaded this entire period with unprecedented
intensity since the 1980s, led to a substantial rise in domestic fuel prices, which more
than doubled in less than a year. Nonetheless, inflation was kept within target in 1999
and 2000.32
 0RQHWDU\3ROLF\5HVSRQVH7KHRUHWLFDODQG(PSLULFDO(YLGHQFH
This section presents impulse response functions to different shocks and compares them
to the actual reaction of monetary policy to supply and financial shocks. The results are
summarized in figures 6 through 9.
We suppose that the economy can be described by the three-equation system presented
in section 3: the IS curve specification is given in equation ,, the augmented Phillips
curve in equation ,,, and the exchange rate dynamics in equation ,9. To complete
the model, we assume that the interest rate is set by the Central Bank with the objective
of minimizing the following loss function:




M W L M W W K
7
M
M W M W W M W
M
W L L K ( ( ' / + +
=
+ + + D + + - =å w w p p w r p
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dummy variable that equals one in the last quarter of each year and 0 otherwise; it
characterizes the fact that the Central Bank is concerned only with year-end deviations
of realized inflation from the established target.
We assume that the economy starts from a steady-state equilibrium and is hit by shocks
of one standard deviation, whose magnitudes are 0.3 percentage points for supply
(equation (,,)), 0.45 percentage points for demand (eq. (,)), and 5 percentage points for

























































As standard models would predict (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999)), demand
shocks require the largest reaction. Figure 6 shows that demand shocks lead to the
highest nominal interest rates during the first six quarters. Supply and financial shocks
lead to very similar reactions, despite the fact that the financial shock is almost ten times
as large as the supply shock. This can be explained by the fact that the reaction of
monetary policy to financial shocks is mainly through its effect on inflation, with a
negligible influence on the output gap. Since the passthrough from exchange rate
variations to inflation is about 10%, the final impact of a financial shock on inflation is
approximately the same as the supply shock, which suggests that a similar reaction is
appropriate for both cases.
The real interest rate presents a different response pattern. It increases in the first period
after a demand shock, but it decreases in the first period after supply and financial
shocks. In other words, right after the economy is hit by the latter two shocks, the
optimal response of the Central Bank is to increase nominal interest rates by a lower
amount than the increase in inflation, thus bringing about an initial reduction in real
interest rates. In the following periods, however, real interest rates rise above
equilibrium, putting inflation into a sine-wave convergence path to its steady-state
value. Figure 7 shows that the deviations of real interest rates from equilibrium after
supply and financial shocks are usually higher than those observed after demand shocks.35
The counterpart of this finding is a more stable path for the output gap following supply
and financial shocks, as shown in figure 9. The accumulated deviations of the output
gap, measured by the area between the impulse response curve and the horizontal axis,
can be interpreted as the sacrifice ratio. After one year, the accumulated deviation of the
output gap is 0.83 for demand shocks, 0.14 for supply shocks, and 0.12 for financial
shocks; the long run values are 0.73, 0.04, and 0.03, respectively.
One should not expect the real economy to replicate the behavior of an impulse
response function, since it is awkward to identify and isolate the effects of individual
shocks. However, an analysis of figure 10 reveals some similarities between the actual
behavior of nominal interest rate and inflation and the prediction of the impulse
response functions. Only supply and financial shocks occurred after the devaluation of




















Nominal interest rate 





It is interesting to examine the shocks that hit the economy in the second half of 1999.
The exchange rate depreciated by 10% from the second to the third quarter of that year;
backward-looking prices increased 8% in the third quarter and 3% in the last quarter;
and food inflation reached 5.6% in the last quarter. In the face of such supply shocks,36
the Central Bank kept the nominal interest rate constant for almost six months. Given
the prevailing out-of-equilibrium environment, this procedure was equivalent to an
increase in the nominal interest rate when the economy is in steady state. It took from
two to three quarters for the nominal interest rate to resume its downward trajectory, as
in the impulse response cases.
17 The behavior of real interest rates was also consistent
with the predictions of the impulse responses: despite the “increasing” nominal interest
rate in the first period (fourth quarter 1999), there was a contemporaneous reduction in
real interest rate. In the following quarter, however, real interest rate did rise. Finally, as
predicted, inflation increased in tandem with the shocks, but it declined faster than
expected: in the first quarter of 2000, IPCA inflation was already below the target value
for the year, if expressed in annualized terms.
 ,QIODWLRQ7DUJHWLQJDQG%DFNZDUG/RRNLQJ3ULFHV
In the Brazilian framework, the inflation target is set for the annual variation of IPCA, a
consumer price index in which the weight of backward-looking prices is approximately
25%. This particularity poses an additional challenge for monetary policymaking, since
backward-looking prices are insensitive to interest rate decisions.
The most important items with backward-looking prices are public utilities, fuel, public
transportation, and minimum wage.
18 The adjustment of these prices follows several
rules. To respect contractual clauses, increases in utility fees are generally based on past
inflation as measured by the general price indices. Prices of gasoline and oil by-products
tend to increase in accordance with the exchange rate and international oil prices.
Finally, the annual adjustment of the minimum wage is not defined by formal rules, but
the political discussion in Congress usually starts from past consumer price inflation.
The group of backward-looking prices accumulated a 36.6% increase in 1999-2000,
while other prices of the economy rose only by 8.8%. Figure 11 shows the evolution of
                                                
17 The overnight rate was lowered from 21% to 19.5% in July 1999, and it remained constant until
October, when it was reduced by 0.5 percentage point. The overnight rate was not lowered again until
March 2000, this time to 18.5% (see figure 4).37
headline IPCA inflation, along with a breakdown of the behavior of backward-looking
prices and the remaining prices. Because the targets are set for headline IPCA inflation,
the behavior of backward-looking prices clearly imposes an important restriction on
monetary policy: real interest rates need to be high in order to keep the forward-looking
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To quantify the influence of backward-looking prices on monetary policy decisions, we
simulate the behavior of monetary policy from 2000 to 2002, assuming that the
economy starts from the initial conditions that prevailed at the end of 1999. We then
compare this behavior using different assumptions about the weight of backward-
looking prices in the IPCA and about their adjustment rules. The results of the exercises
are based on the four-equation model presented in section 3. The only difference is that
the Phillips curve is modified to take explicit account of backward-looking prices in
explaining inflation.
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18 In the IPCA, the minimum wage variation corresponds to the full variation of the “Domestic
Employee” category, whose weight is around 3%.38
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All variables are expressed in logarithms, S stands for the price level, Z for wages, K for
the output gap, H for the nominal exchange rate, the superscript “P” for market goods
(that is, goods and services whose prices are free to adjust to market conditions), and the
superscript “EO” for backward-looking prices.
Equation (5.1) establishes that consumer prices are a weighted average of market and
backward-looking prices. Equation (5.2) defines the variable ] as international prices
(S
) expressed in terms of the domestic currency. Note that the exchange rate, H, is the
number of units of domestic currency needed to buy one unit of foreign currency, such
that an increase in H means a depreciation of the domestic currency. Equation (5.3) is
the price equation for market goods. Such prices are a weighted average of international
prices and domestic wages. Equation (5.4) defines the wage dynamics, which depends
on expected inflation, past inflation and the output gap. The restriction that the
coefficients of expected and past inflation sum to one guarantees the verticality of the
Phillips curve.
After differentiating equations (5.1) and (5.3), and substituting equations (5.3) and (5.4)
into equation (5.1) we get the reduced-form Phillips curve:
[]
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The estimated coefficients presented the expected sign, and all were significant at
conventional values. Wald tests also showed that the reduced-form coefficients were
statistically different from zero at conventional significance levels.
Varying the value of  , the weight of market prices in the consumer basket, generates a
family of Phillips curves. We now define “market inflation equation” as the Phillips39
curve that results when   = 1. Otherwise, we refer to the “headline inflation Phillips
curve”. Before comparing the two curves, it is necessary to model backward-looking
prices. By assumption, they are a weighted average of past inflation and external price
variation:
1 1 ) 1 ( - - D - + × = W W
EO
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Table 2 shows the difference between the estimated coefficients of the market and
KHDGOLQHLQIODWLRQHTXDWLRQVIRUGLIIHUHQWYDOXHVRI 7KHGHJUHHRILQHUWLDPHDVXUHG
by the estimated coefficient of past inflation in the reduced form, depends positively on
the value of b. When b increases, headline inflation shows stronger persistence, as
evidenced by a larger coefficient of  t–1, while for b = 0, market inflation is more lag
dependent. The exchange rate passthrough is smaller for market inflation only if b = 1.
Finally, as expected, the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap is larger in the absence
of backward-looking SULFHV    =  1). In this case, the transmission mechanism of
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(  -0.073 -0.073 -0.073
W–￿ 0.086 0.017 -0.052
K -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
]W ]W￿￿ -0.012 0.056 0.125
$PRUHUHDFWLYHPRQHWDU\SROLF\LVH[SHFWHGXQGHUVWURQJLQHUWLDDVLQWKHFDVH  = 1,
since the level of interest rate needed to reduce inflation by any amount is higher than in
the case of weak inertia. On the other hand, since monetary policy is relatively
inefficient in this environment and the Central Bank’s loss function is assumed to
include output gap and interest rate smoothing, monetary policy should not react
strongly to deviations of inflation from the target, as Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999)
point out. Henceforth, we refer to these two factors as inertial and efficiency effects.40
Since they work in opposite directions, it is not possible to tell DSULRUL in which case
the Central Bank would be more aggressive.
Based on the equations for headline and market inflation, we ran simulations with the
assumption that the economy starts from the initial conditions that prevailed at the end
of 1999 and that the Central Bank chooses the interest rate path (from 2000 to 2002) to
minimize the loss function presented in section 5.2:
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Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the simulations under two alternative rules for the
adjustment of backward-looking prices, that is, different values of b. The first column in
table 3 presents the baseline case of year-end market inflation, generated from
VLPXODWLRQVXVLQJWKHHVWLPDWHGFRHIILFLHQWVRIWKH3KLOOLSVFXUYH  = 1). The remaining
columns show how the baseline results change in the presence of backward-looking
prices, when their weights in the Phillips curve are restricted to 13% and 20%. These
columns exhibit the difference between the cases of headline and market inflation for
three variables: year-end inflation, and yearly averages of nominal and real interest
rates. Finally, table 4 shows the differences in results that arise when we simulate a
faster disinflation, that is, instead of pursuing inflation targets of 6%, 4%, and 3.5%
from 2000 to 2002, the Central Bank would need to meet targets of 5%, 3%, and 2.5%.
7DEOH±(IIHFWRI%DFNZDUG/RRNLQJ3ULFHV
'LIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHFDVHVRI+HDGOLQHDQG0DUNHW,QIODWLRQ









  :HLJKWRIEDFNZDUGORRNLQJSULFHV   
 5.55 -0.03 0.55 0.55 -0.27 -1.59 -1.22
 4.05 0.16 0.58 0.39 0.03 -0.50 -0.52
 3.64 0.03 -0.15 -0.18 -0.10 -0.68 -0.55
  :HLJKWRIEDFNZDUGORRNLQJSULFHV   
 5.55 -0.01 0.93 0.90 -0.32 -2.39 -1.93
 4.05 0.24 0.80 0.52 -0.02 -0.95 -0.89
 3.64 0.01 -0.37 -0.36 -0.18 -1.05 -0.8341
7DEOH±(IIHFWVRID)DVWHU'LVLQIODWLRQ  
0DUNHW,QIODWLRQ +HDGOLQH,QIODWLRQ   +HDGOLQH,QIODWLRQ  







 -0.97 -0.56 0.50 -0.98 0.06 1.10 -1.15 -1.75 -0.45
 -0.95 -0.85 0.19 -0.79 -0.24 0.61 -0.88 -1.04 -0.07
 -0.97 -0.89 0.12 -0.95 -1.10 -0.10 -1.04 -1.32 -0.22
)RUDQGZKHQWKHGHJUHHRILQHUWLDLVWKHKLJKHVW  = 1), the inertial effect
dominates the efficiency effect. Nominal and real interest rates would have to be about
half percentage point higher in the case of the headline inflation Phillips curve than in
the case of the market inflation Phillips curve. The difference in interest rates would
have to be even greater if the weight of backward-looking prices increased from 13% to
20%. This pattern is reversed for 2002, however: nominal and real interest rates are
smaller under the headline inflation than under market inflation.
We attribute this result to the offsetting nature of the inertial and efficiency effects. To
achieve the target in 2000, inflation should be reduced by 2.9 percentage points, which
is the difference between observed inflation in 1999 (8.9%) and the 6% target for 2000.
For 2001, inflation would have to be reduced by 1.55 pp in the market inflation case.
For 2002, however, the disinflation effort is significantly smaller, at 0.55 pp for market
inflation. The inertial effect thus dominates the efficiency effect when annual
disinflation is high. The figures in table 4 are consistent with this interpretation. When
disinflation is faster, the interest rate difference between headline and market inflation
rises to 1.10 pp in 2000 and 0.61 pp in 2001, implying a stronger inertial effect.
19
,WLVPRUHGLIILFXOWWRFRPSDUHWKHFDVHRIKHDGOLQHLQIODWLRQZLWK  ZLWKWKHEDVHOLQH
market inflation case. The higher passthrough may slow the reduction in interest rates,
given the inflationary effects of the consequent exchange rate depreciation. On the other
KDQGWKHFDVHRI  SUHVHQWVDUHODWLYHO\VPDOOGHJUHHRILQIODWLRQLQHUWLDDQG D
                                                
19 A faster disinflation allows the Central Bank to set relatively lower nominal interest rates. In the model,
this results from the fact that a smaller target for inflation would also reduce inflation expectations and,
hence, current inflation. Since the optimal real interest rates are higher, a faster disinflation still implies a
tighter monetary policy.42
reduced efficiency of monetary policy, which encourages the Central Bank to cut
interest rates aggressively. According to table 3, the balance of all these factors favors a
faster reduction in interest rates when the Central Bank faces a headline inflation
3KLOOLSVFXUYHZLWK  
 021,725,1*,1)/$7,217$5*(7681'(5$1,0)352*5$0
This section focuses on alternative ways of assessing the monetary policy stance in
inflation-targeting countries that have an ongoing program with the IMF. Brazil was the
first country to adopt inflation targeting while a financial support program was under
way. This raised some important issues with regard to assessment. The usual
performance criterion on net domestic assets is not adequate for an inflation-targeting
regime, because it harms transparency and may induce unnecessary monetary
movements.
We compare the behavior of inflation, the output gap and interest rates under alternative
criteria to evaluate the monetary policy stance, which may be more suitable for an
inflation targeting country. We first describe four accountability alternatives:
I) Year-end inflation target. This is the original inflation-targeting framework in
Brazil. The Ministry of Finance sets the year-end target and the tolerance bands
two years in advance. The current targets are 6%, 4% and 3.5% for 2000, 2001
and 2002, respectively, and the Central Bank is considered successful in achieving
the target if actual year-end inflation falls within a ±2 pp band around the target.
II) Quarterly inflation targets, set by a linear convergence rule, as established in
the fourth review of the current agreement with the IMF. According to this
criterion, twelve-month inflation for each quarter should equal the value obtained
by linear interpolation of the adjacent year-end targets. For example, given the 6%
and 4% year-end targets for 2000 and 2001, the target path from the first to the
third quarters of 2001 should be 5.5%, 5% and 4.5%. A potential problem with
this criterion is the fact that shocks in a given year contaminate the quarterly43
twelve-month inflation figures of the following year, and forces the monetary
authority to react unnecessarily to such shocks.
III) Quarterly inflation targets that take into account the actual outcomes observed
in the previous year. Whereas the previous alternative outlines a quarterly target
path based on year-end targets, this criterion is based on the actual inflation
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L 7 p  is the twelve-month inflation target for quarter L in year 7;  M 7 , 1 - p  is the
actual inflation observed in quarter M in year 7; and 
*
7 p is the inflation target for
year 7. The target for the first quarter of a year would be the actual inflation
observed in the last three quarters of the previous year, plus ¼ of the inflation
target for the current year; the target for the second quarter would be actual
inflation observed in the second half of the previous year, plus ½ of the inflation
target for the current year; and so on. The target path should be reset at the
beginning of each year, once the previous year’s inflation is known. This criterion
overcomes one of the major drawbacks of alternative II, namely, the fact that
shocks in a given year contaminate monetary policy decisions in the following
year, irrespective of the effects such shocks have on inflation. Both criteria,
however, have the potential drawback of increasing the frequency of monetary
performance evaluation, from yearly to quarterly.
IV) A Taylor-type rule.
The starting point of the analysis is to assume the Central Bank sets the nominal interest
rate L to minimize the loss function:
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Equation (6.1) is the loss function already discussed in section 5.2. The value of the
dummy variable, D, varies according to the alternative chosen. For alternative (I), in
which the Central Bank cares only about year-end inflation, D equals one in the last
quarter of each year and zero in all other quarters. Under alternatives (II) and (III), D
equals one in all quarters, meaning that monetary policy should be evaluated every
quarter.
Equations (6.2) to (6.4) are the constraints of the minimization problem; they form a
small structural macroeconomic model in the lines presented in section 3. Condition
(6.5) assumes a diagonal variance-covariance matrix. Additionally, the error terms are
assumed to be independent, identically and normally distributed. The calibrated values
for the standard errors were 0.5 percentage point for output gap, 0.3 percentage point for
inflation, and 5 percentage points for the exchange rate.
To run stochastic simulations, we assumed the Central Bank minimizes the loss function
WDNLQJLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQHLJKWSHULRGVDKHDGZLWKDGLVFRXQWUDWHRI  = 0.99).
This horizon might be considered relatively short by international standards, but it is a
reasonable hypothesis for the Brazilian economy, which is characterized by a higher
level of uncertainty, given it is still in transition to its steady-state inflation level.
Furthermore, evidence shows that optimizing periods beyond 8 quarters do not yield
gains in terms of efficiency in the output-inflation variability locus (see Freitas and
Muinhos (2001)). Finally, this optimization horizon is also in line with the ,QIODWLRQ
5HSRUW, which releases the forecasts of inflation up to two years ahead.45
In the stochastic simulations, we assumed that at the beginning of quarter W, when the
interest rate is set, the central bank knows the realization of all variables up to W, but
does not know the shock. The results presented in table 5 were obtained after 150
simulations. We performed the simulations as if the economy were at the beginning of
2000. All variables took their actual values as initial conditions, except for the output
gap, which was set to zero at the end of 1999. This modification in the initial conditions
regarding the output gap allows us to concentrate on the contamination effect described
in alternative II above, since IPCA inflation in 1999 was 0.9 percentage point above the
target.
Finally, the simulations for alternative IV do not need the optimization procedure, since
with the Taylor-type rule the interest rate is simply set according to observed outcomes.
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where L is the annualized quarterly interest rate and L
* is the equilibrium nominal interest
rate. To be consistent with the loss function, we introduced interest rate smoothing: the
actual interest rate is the weighted average of the previous value of the interest rate and
the one given by equation (6.6), with weights 0.60 and 0.40, respectively.
Table 5 shows that all alternatives lead to a level of expected year-end inflation that is
well within the ±2-percentage point tolerance bands established in the Brazilian
inflation-targeting framework, despite the initial conditions (inflation was almost one
percentage point above the target). Such results can be explained by the short lag of the
transmission mechanism. Decisions regarding interest rates affect inflation
contemporaneously through the exchange rate channel and take only two quarters to
affect inflation through the aggregate demand channel. The output gap performance was
also good, in the sense that it stayed within a band of ±1 percentage point during most
of the period for all alternatives.46
7DEOH±5HVXOWVRIWKH6WRFKDVWLF6LPXODWLRQV
PRQWKLQIODWLRQ 2XWSXWJDS 1RPLQDOLQWHUHVWUDWH 6WGGHYRILQIODWLRQ
<HDU 4
, ,, ,,, ,9 , ,, ,,, ,9 , ,, ,,, ,9 , ,, ,,, ,9
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 8.28 8.26 8.27 8.14 1.05 0.98 1.05 1.04 20.2 20.5 21.0 24.9 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.56
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 8.65 8.63 8.54 8.28 1.16 1.12 1.10 0.77 20.5 20.9 21.7 33.2 1.53 1.50 1.44 1.26
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 7.62 7.59 7.49 7.19 0.77 0.65 0.62 -0.62 20.1 20.1 20.9 30.4 1.24 1.22 1.12 0.98
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5.22 5.22 5.14 4.89 0.06 0.09 0.01 -1.10 17.6 16.6 17.7 13.3 0.56 0.63 0.61 0.89
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5.11 5.12 5.11 4.72 0.01 0.19 -0.03 -0.25 15.9 14.9 16.1 13.4 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.74
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4.94 5.01 4.98 4.55 -0.02 0.18 -0.09 -0.07 14.2 13.3 14.4 14.7 0.82 0.87 0.83 0.81
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3.61 3.64 3.57 3.57 -0.37 -0.17 -0.41 -0.50 11.0 10.3 10.6 9.3 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.87
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3.28 3.33 3.31 3.48 -0.35 -0.14 -0.34 -0.14 9.4 8.9 9.1 8.4 0.79 0.73 0.75 0.84
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3.39 3.47 3.44 3.57 -0.21 0.04 -0.10 0.07 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.7 0.65 0.62 0.67 0.80
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
7DEOHFRQW±5HVXOWVRIWKH6WRFKDVWLF6LPXODWLRQV
6WGGHYRIRXWSXWJDS 3URE  
!SS 3URE  
!SS
<HDU 4
, ,, ,,, ,9 , ,, ,,, ,9 , ,, ,,, ,9
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.45 0.41 0.47 0.46 3.0 3.3 7.3 9.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.61 67.0 72.7 66.0 43.7 13.0 10.7 10.0 8.7
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.64 50.5 52.0 45.3 30.0 5.5 4.7 2.0 4.3
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.59 0.64 0.58 0.95 7.0 10.0 10.7 25.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.3
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.66 0.65 0.53 0.96 14.0 11.3 12.7 20.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.65 0.57 0.54 1.06 22.5 27.3 23.3 21.3 0.5 1.3 0.7 1.7
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.65 0.64 0.62 1.08 10.0 15.3 9.3 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.66 0.57 0.66 1.12 20.5 14.7 17.3 22.3 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.3
￿￿￿￿ ￿ 0.58 0.57 0.65 1.19 12.0 10.7 13.3 20.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
Obs.: i) Alternative I: original Brazilian IT framework, with targets set only for year-end inflation.
ii) Alternative II: quarterly inflation targets set by a linear convergence rule.
iii) Alternative III: quarterly target path based on the actual inflation figures of the preceding year.
iv) Alternative IV: use of a Taylor-type rule.
v) The standard deviation of inflation refers to deviations from the target, not from the mean. Since
there is no quarterly target defined for Alternative I, the standard deviation was estimated using the
target set for Alternative II.
It is difficult to rank the alternatives by looking only at the variability of inflation and
output. Only the Taylor rule (alternative IV) yielded generally higher volatility for both
inflation and output. The figures for the other three alternatives do not prompt clear-cut
conclusions, either because the qualitative pattern is not stable or because the
differences in standard deviations are small. The results presented in table 6 were
calculated from the loss function for alternative I (in which only year-end inflation rates47
matter). The performance of the Taylor rule
20 was clearly the worst, while alternatives II
(linear target path) and III (the target path based on the previous year’s outcomes)
yielded a relative loss of approximately 15%.
7DEOH±$EVROXWHDQG5HODWLYH/RVVHV
$OWHUQDWLYHV
, ,, ,,, ,9
/RVV 0.85 0.99 0.97 5.29
5HODWLYH/RVV - 16.2 14.0 521.4
The similar performance of the first three alternatives is a surprising result. We expected
alternative I to present a visibly better performance for year-end inflation, because it
ignores inflation outcomes in the first three quarters of the year, while alternative II was
expected to yield the worst outcome, since it forces monetary policy to react to large
deviations of inflation from the target in the previous year. The presence of output gap
and interest rate variation in the loss function in all quarters may have contributed to
making the three alternatives more similar. Another possible explanation is related to
the backward-looking component of inflation. To meet the year-end inflation target, the
monetary authority needs to put a high weight on the inflation outcomes of the interim
quarters. Therefore, the effect of changing the accountability frequency may have been
mild.
These findings, however, do not imply that the Central Bank should be indifferent in
choosing among the first three alternatives. If the Central Bank is in fact concerned only
with the year-end accumulated inflation, then setting a quarterly target path for inflation
is not likely to severely alter the behavior of macroeconomic variables. Should
monetary policy be evaluated on a quarterly basis, however, there is a high probability
that unnecessary false alarms would be triggered in the course of the year. In the context
of the current agreement, an informal consultation with the IMF is triggered if inflation
deviates from the target path by more than one percentage point, and a formal
consultation is required if the deviation exceeds 2 percentage points. The probability of
                                                
20 It is possible, however, that the performance of the Taylor rule could dramatically improve if a different
set of parameters is chosen.48
inflation deviating from the target by more than one percentage point falls significantly
as the year progresses (see table 5). This is a particularly delicate issue for an emerging
economy, because false alarms may trigger a confidence crisis and thus make the
conduct of monetary policy more difficult. A compromise solution to this problem
would be to increase the tolerance interval for the first three quarters of the year; this
would preserve the quarterly accountability frequency while reducing the probability of
triggering false alarms.
 &21&/86,216
The relative success of economic policy in Brazil since the 1999 devaluation stems from
a variety of factors, including the initial macroeconomic conditions, the strong
international support, and the inflation-targeting regime that provided an adequate and
timely anchor for expectations. The most important factor, however, was the long-
awaited fiscal reversal, which was a necessary (but obviously not sufficient) condition
for the sustainability of the inflation-targeting framework.
Despite the huge devaluation in early 1999, the year ended with single digit consumer
price inflation, which fell within the target set by mid-year, and with a near 1 percent
GDP growth, which was well above the preliminary prospects. Inflation behavior
showed a very low passthrough, which can be in part attributed to the output gap in the
period, the overvalued UHDO just before the floating, and the low initial inflation. The
inflation-targeting regime guided expectations in line with the multi-year disinflation
targets, allowing the relative price realignment after the devaluation to be processed
without igniting overwhelming pressures on consumer prices.
However, the large swing in relative prices poses some idiosyncratic challenges for the
monetary authority. The evolution of the backward-looking prices is if particular
concern. Such prices correspond to around 25% of the IPCA and have increased by
36.6% in 1999-2000, while all other prices taken together rose by only 8.8% in the same
period.49
The results of simulation using different assumptions regarding the adjustment rule and
the weight of backward-looking prices in the IPCA show that when the adjustment of
these prices is based on past inflation, the degree of inertia increases and forces the
Central Bank to be more restrictive in order to disinflate the economy. Nominal and real
interest rates are 0.5 to 1 percentage point higher when the Central Bank faces a Phillips
curve with backward-looking prices. When inflation is closer to its steady-state value,
however, the presence of administered prices in the IPCA does not alter the behavior of
monetary policy significantly.
We presented a brief description of the Brazilian experience, showing how monetary
policy reacted to different shocks. In the inflation-targeting period, all the shocks that
hit the economy propagated their effects mainly through the supply side and financial
markets. Although the shocks displayed some common features, such as rising oil
prices, the rapidly changing overall economic conditions demanded different responses.
We confronted the theoretical policy prescriptions with estimated impulse responses to
different kinds of shocks in a simple empirical model. As expected, the results showed
that a central bank should be fairly restrictive when countering aggregate demand
shocks, but it should partially accommodate supply and financial shocks by
contemporaneously increasing nominal interest rates while allowing real interest rates to
fall. Real interest rates eventually rise with the subsequent fall in inflation. This pattern,
suggested by the impulse response functions, was observed in recent episodes in Brazil.
When facing supply and financial shocks in the last two quarters of 1999, the Central
Bank kept nominal interest rates constant at a level above long-run equilibrium and
allowed real interest to fall. With inflation under control, real interest rates rose again in
the following quarter, and the Central Bank resumed the trend of reducing interest rates.
Finally, the paper addressed the issue of how to monitor inflation targeting under
agreements with the IMF. We used a simple structural model to show that except in the
case of a Taylor rule, the behavior of relevant macroeconomic variables does not change
significantly when the frequency at which monetary policy is evaluated increases from
yearly to quarterly. However, a central bank should not be indifferent when choosing50
between year-end accountability only and quarterly monitored accountability, such as
that established in recent Brazilian agreements with the IMF. The reason is simple: if
the relevant macroeconomic variables are initially out of equilibrium, then the
probability of meeting the target by year-end may be high while the probability of
breaching the tolerance bands in the intermediate quarters is also high. Monitoring
quarterly inflation figures under such circumstances can send unnecessary false alarms,
introducing an unwarranted noise in the conduct of monetary policy by affecting
expectations.51
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